Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

Erling A. Roylance v. Lynn B. Rowe, Dean L.
Bristow, J.R. Monnahan, and Mountain View
Hospital : Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
S. Rex Lewis; Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
David W. Slagle; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Defendants.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Erling A. Roylance v. Lynn B. Rowe, Dean L. Bristow, J.R. Monnahan, and Mountain View Hospital, No. 870213.00 (Utah
Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1663

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ERLING A. ROYLANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Ct. App. Case No.
860023-CA

LYNN B. ROWE, DEAN L. BRISTOW,
J.R. MONNAHAN, and MOUNTAIN
VIEW HOSPITAL,

Sup. Ct. Case No.

vs.

Category 13
Defendants-Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE HONORABLE JUDITH M. BILLINGS, R.W. GARFF,
AND NORMAN H. JACKSON, APPELLATE JUDGES, PRESIDING

David W. Slagle, for:
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Attorneys
for
Defendants'
Respondents Rowe and Bristow
S. Rex Lewis and
Leslie W. Slaugh, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P. 0. BOX 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant Roylance

FILED
JUN111987
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ERLING A. ROYLANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Ct. App. Case No.
860023-CA

LYNN B. ROWE, DEAN L. BRISTOW,
J.R. MONNAHAN, and MOUNTAIN
VIEW HOSPITAL,

Sup. Ct. Case No.
19928

vs.

Category 13
Defendants-Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE HONORABLE JUDITH M. BILLINGS, R.W. GARFF,
AND NORMAN H. JACKSON, APPELLATE JUDGES, PRESIDING

David W. Slagle, for:
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. BOX 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Attorneys
for
DefendantsRespondents Rowe and Bristow
S. Rex Lewis and
Leslie W. Slaugh, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant Roylance

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

NATURE OF THE CASE

1

COURSE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

ARGUMENT

8

POINT I

8

THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED AT TRIAL DOES NOT FULLY
REVEAL ALL OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE ACCIDENT.
POINT II

14

DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
CONCLUSION

16

APPENDIX
A.

Opinion of Utah Court of Appeals

i

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Cases c i t e d ;
Anderton v . Montgomery, 607 P . 2 d 828 (Utah 1980)
B a l l h o r s t v . Hohner-Foreman-Cole.

Inc..

8

207 Kan. 8 9 ,

484 P . 2 d 38 (1971)

9 , 13

Crawford v. Rogers. 406 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1965)

9

Dabroe v. Rhodes Co.. 64 Wash.2d 431, 392 P.2d 317 (1964).

9

Hugo v. Manning. 201 Kan. 391, 441 P.2d 145 (1968). . . .

9, 11

Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp.. 681 P.2d 1232

9, 11

(Utah 1984)
Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980)

12, 15

Roylance v. Rowe. 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1987). .
Statutes cited;

9, 14

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-5 (Supp. 1986)

1

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Was

the

plaintiff

entitled

to

a res

ipsa

loquitur

instruction when the evidence at trial did not fully reveal all
the facts and circumstances surrounding his injury, specifically
the origin and location of the sponge which precipitated the
defendants1 performance of an unnecessary second operation?
2.

Were defendants negligent as a matter of law where they

performed an admittedly needless operation without taking simple
and readily performed measures to determine whether the operation
was necessary?
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, plaintiffappellant files this petition and requests a grant of a Writ of
Certiorari

to

the Utah

Supreme

Court,

Plaintiff-appellants

petition for Writ of Certiorari follows a decision in the Utah
Court of Appeals, Case No. 860023-CA, filed May 12, 1987.

This

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-5 (Supp.
1986).
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action based upon the subjection of the plaintiff
to unnecessary risk and injury by needless surgery performed by
the defendants, Dr. Rowe and Dr. Bristow.

On June 23, 1981, the

defendant doctors, following the removal of an acute gangrenous
perforated gallbladder, examined x-rays taken of the plaintiff and

noted that a surgical sponge was visible on the x-rays.
taking

any

further

x-rays

and

even

though

the

Without

sponge

count

indicated that no sponge had been left in plaintiff, the plaintiff
was taken back to the operating room for removal of the surgical
sponge.

No sponge was located.

Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant doctors, the
radiologist, and Mountain View Hospital on the theory that the
defendants

breached

their duty

of ordinary

care

owed

to the

plaintiff resulting in the plaintiff»s injury.
COURSE AND DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURTS
The matter came to trial on December 27, 1983, in the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, Utah, J. Robert
Bullock, District Judge, presiding.

Defendant Dr. Monnahan was

dismissed at pre-trial without objection by the other defendants.
Plaintiff moved to dismiss the defendant Mountain View Hospital
prior to the commencement

of the trial.

Defendants Rowe and

Bristow objected and the court refused to dismiss the hospital.
The court dismissed the defendant hospital at the conclusion of
the plaintiff's
hospital.

case and directed

January

in favor of the

The case was submitted for jury deliberation on special

verdict December 27, 1983.
doctor

a verdict

defendants

not

The jury found the remaining two

negligent

and

judgment

was

entered

on

5, 1984, in favor of the defendants and against the
2

plaintiff, no cause for action.

On April 16, 1984, the trial

court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and plaintiff
subsequently

appealed

to this Court.

Plaintiff's

appeal was

assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 860023-CA, and set
for hearing on April 27, 1987. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of the trial court in an opinion filed May 12, 1987.
Roylance v. Rowe, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1987).

A copy of

the opinion is attached hereto as Appendix "A".
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 22, 1981, it was determined that the plaintiff,
Erling Roylance, who was then 74 years of age, was suffering from
a kidney stone.

(R. 474).

On June 13, 1981, surgery to remove

the stone, "proximal ureteral lithotomy," was performed by the
defendant,

Dr. Dean

L. Bristow.

(R. 473-76).

Within days

following the operation the plaintiff became increasingly ill and
was transferred to the Intensive Care Unit (R. 481-82), and it was
determined that an additional operation was necessary.
99).

(R. 495-

Dr. Rowe, a general surgeon, was consulted (R. 499) and on

June 22, 1981, at 11:30 p.m., an emergency surgery was performed
by Drs. Rowe and Bristow for the purpose of removing an acute
gangrenous perforated gallbladder.

(R. 437, 499, 505-06, 763. 1).

As is standard procedure, prior to the initial incision the
scrub nurse counted the "sponges."

3

The "sponges" are actually a

radio-opaque gauze and in this instance were approximately a 4" x
4" size.

(R. 429, 432).

Just before completing the operation,

another sponge count was taken.

Typically, and in this instance,

a count is taken just prior to the closing of the peritoneum,
which is about three layers below the skin.

(R. 435, 438).

Another count was completed during the closing of the fascia,
which is about two layers from the skin.

The circulating nurse

counted the used sponges and the scrub nurse counted the sponges
not used.
count.

The figures were totaled and matched the pre-incision

(R. 435-36, 438). The count was again correct.

(R. 439).

Upon completion of surgery the doctors closed the plaintiff's
incision and he was then taken to the Intensive Care Unit in good
condition, asleep from the anesthesia. (R. 511, 553).
While the patient was still in the Intensive Care Unit, Dr.
Bristow ordered an x-ray to be taken of the bladder area to
ascertain the position of the catheter.
2:32 a.m.
developed.

(R. 415-16, 451, 511).
(R. 512-13).

This x-ray was taken at

Minutes later the x-ray was

A second x-ray was taken at 2:42 a.m.

(R. 415, 417, 453, 511).
In addition to that which the doctors expected to see, there
appeared on both x-rays a sponge marker indicating the presence of
4 M x 4" piece of gauze.

(R. 514, 517). The doctors, fearful that

the sponge had been left within the patient, proceeded to check
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l tu6,

At this point the patient was still under anesthesia and in
critically

ill condition.

(R. 518)•

Defendants conceded that

another x-ray creates insignificant risk as opposed to an exploratory operation, (R. 520, 533, 536, 757), especially where the
patient

is critically

ill.

(R. 536).

The mere

additional anesthesia is potentially hazardous.

induction of

(R. 527).

The doctors approached the plaintiff's family and indicated
their assumption that a sponge had been left within the patient.
The doctors explained that the plaintiff was still asleep due to
the anesthesia

and that they wanted to return the plaintiff-

patient to surgery, open up the original incision and search for
the sponge.
The
received

(R. 520-21, 553) .

nurse

who

had

a telephone

completed

call

from

the

the

original

sponge

anesthesiologist

advised that the original sponge count was incorrect.

count

and was
The nurse

responded that the count was correct, but returned to the hospital
to assist in the subsequent operation.

(R. 440).

The subsequent operation took place from approximately 3:30
a.m. to 5:00 a.m. (R. 525, 601). The doctors failed to locate any
sponge or gauze.

(R. 441, 523-24).

The doctors called for a

portable x-ray machine and while still in the operating room took
additional x-rays at approximately 4:15 a.m.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED AT TRIAL DOES NOT FULLY REVEAL
ALL OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INJURY.
Plaintiff

claimed

error

in the trial

instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur.

court's refusal to

The Court of Appeals

acknowledged that plaintiff had met the general prerequisites for
application

of res

ipsa

loquitur, but

held

that

use

of the

doctrine was precluded in this case because the plaintiff's proof
was too detailed.

This decision of the Court of Appeals is

contrary to previously established Utah law.
This Court has clearly defined the circumstances under which
a party is entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction:
Such circumstances, which have been defined by
law, are (1) that the accident was of a kind
which, in the ordinary course of events, would
not have happened had due care been observed;
(2) that the plaintiff's own use or operation
of the ajency or instrumentality was not
primarily responsible for the injuries; and
(3) that the agency or instrumentality causing
the injury was under the exclusive management
or control of the defendant.
Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980).
In deciding whether the facts warrant such an instruction,
doubts are to be resolved in favor of giving the instruction.

Id.

The Court of Appeals apparently assumed that these elements

8

had been met, but held that the case came within an exception to
the general rule:
Application of res ipsa loquitur is,
however, premised on the plaintiff's inability
to produce evidence identifying the precise
negligent act or omission on the part of a
defendant which caused the harm. There is no
room for the operation of res ipsa loquitur
where the evidence in the case reveals all of
the facts and circumstances of the occurrence
and clearly establishes the precise allegedly
negligent act which is the cause of plaintiff's injury.
See Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel
Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah
1984). See also Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d
189, 193 (Alaska 1965); Ballhorst v. HahnerForman-Cale, Inc.. [sic: Foreman] 207 Kan. 89,
99, 484 P.2d 38, 46 (1971); Hugo v. Manning.
201 Kan. 391, 395-98, 441 P.2d 145, 149-51
(1968); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash, [sic:
Wash.2d] 431, 392 P.2d 317, 322 (1964).
57 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35, slip op. at 3.
The Utah Court of Appeals thereafter concluded that "inasmuch
as the evidence introduced by Roylance clearly and completely
delineated how Roylance's injuries occurred, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur has no application, as there is nothing left to
infer."

Id. at 36; slip op. at 4.

This conclusion is based on the doctors admitting "that a
second surgery was performed to remove what appeared to be a
sponge left inside the defendant [sic]; they do not deny that this
surgery was performed following a correct sponge count but after a

9

suspicious x-ray; tley do not deny that the subsequent operation
failed to locate any sponge or gauze."

Id.

As the Court of Appeals states it,

"the issue remains

whether at trial Roylance offered evidence of specific negligence
so as to fully explain the alleged negligent cause of injury."
Id.

Plaintiff acknowledges that the foregoing facts admitted by

the defendants are evidence of specific negligence, however, those
facts do not fully explain the alleged negligent cause of injury.
The defendants subjected the plaintiff to the second surgery
based upon what was seen in the original x-rays taken following
the first surgery.

If a sponge had not shown up in those x-rays,

there would have been no second surgery.

The second surgery was,

therefore, directly related to the sponge observed in the original
x-rays.

The sponge seen on those original x-rays was, however,

never found.

The parties to this suit do not know from whence

came the sponge that appeared on the original x-rays.

They never

knew the whereabouts of the sponge on the original x-rays.

They

cannot explain why the sponge was never found upon the reopening
of the incision.
In sum, the parties did not and could not reveal all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the negligent cause of injury.
If all the facts had been conclusively established, including the
exact location of the sponge, then the doctors would not have
10

performed the second surgery and appellant would not have been
injured.
Although plaintiff does not know what caused a gauze to
appear on the x-rays nor what happened to that gauze, plaintiff
was penalized for what he did know.

This problem was explained by

the Supreme Court of Kansas in Hugo v. Manning, 201 Kan. 391, 441
P.2d 145 (1968), cited by the Court of Appeals:
However, there is no reason in law why a
plaintiff may not offer such evidence as may
be available tending to show specifically the
items of negligence and still rely upon the
inference also permitted under res ipsa
loquitur.
A number of different causes or
inferences may thus be left to the final
determination of the triers of the facts. . .
We think that in cases in which a plaintiff
is entitled to rely on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, he should not be penalized by
the loss of a presumption because he has been
willing to go forward and do the best he can
to prove specific acts of negligence. On the
contrary, he should be encouraged to give the
court, the jury, and even the defendant the
benefit of whatever facts, if any, his effort
may develop toward revealing the specific
causes of the mishap.
441 P.2d at 151.
Application of this rule is illustrated by the Utah case of
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984),
also cited by the Court of Appeals.

The plaintiff in that case

was injured while unloading shrubs from his truck at a K-Mart
store.

The plaintiff had been loading the shrubs on a pallet

11

provided by K-Mart held on a fork lift operated by a K-Mart
employee.

The pallet broke, causing the plaintiff to fall and

injure himself.

The plaintiff sued on two theories, (1) negligent

failure to inspect the pallets, and (2) negligent maintenance of
the pallets.

K-Mart had admitted that it had failed to inspect

the pallets.

There was also evidence, apparently undisputed, that

the pallets were stacked on K-Martfs premises in an unprotected
area where they were sometimes run over by motor vehicles.
Under the circumstances in Kusy, this Court held that a res
ipsa instruction would not be appropriate under the negligent
failure to inspect doctrine, because all the facts were known.
Under the negligent maintenance theory, however, the Court held
that a res ipsa instruction should have been given.

Although

there was evidence of specific acts of negligent maintenance by
the defendant, there was no clear demonstration of the cause of
the defect in the pallet that broke.

681 P.2d at 1236.

The Utah Court of Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P. 2d 348 (Utah
1980), also establishes that an instruction on res ipsa loquitur
should have been given in the instant matter.

In that case, the

undisputed evidence established that the doctors had performed a
surgical procedure on the plaintiff while she was under anesthesia, that a needle had become disengaged from its needle holder
during the surgery, and that the doctors failed to remove the
12

needle or disclose the existence of it to the plaintiff.

This

Court held under these circumstances that the giving of a res ipsa
loquitur instruction was appropriate.
Application of the doctrine is also illustrated in the Kansas
case of Ballhorst v. Hahner-Forman-Cale, Inc., 207 Kan. 89, 484
P.2d 38 (1971), also cited by the Court of Appeals.

In that case,

the defendant was injured by the collapse of a block wall being
constructed by the defendant.

The undisputed evidence established

that gusty winds prevailing in the area could blow down that type
of wall, and that bracing was necessary.

The evidence further

established that defendants had removed part of the bracing prior
to the accident.

The manner in which the wall was constructed and

the amount and nature of the bracing were all exclusively under
the control of the defendant.

The plaintiff was therefore able to

prove all of the specific acts of negligence by the defendant
except the actual nechanics of how the wall fell.

Under these

circumstances, the Supreme Court of Kansas rejected the defendant's contention that res ipsa loquitur was not appropriate.
In the instant case, there was no dispute that the x-rays
showed a sponge marker, that the subsequent operation failed to
disclose the sponge, and that the operation was therefore unnecessary.

The evidence did not reveal, however, the location of the

sponge which appeared on the x-rays.
13

Plaintiff was no able to

fully explain the cause of his injury*

An instruction on res ipsa

loquitur should have been given, and the Court of Appeals' failure
to so hold is clearly contrary to existing Utah law.
POINT II
DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The Court of Appeals stated that the record in this case
"contains ample evidence to support the jury's finding that the
doctors were not negligent."
2.

57 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35; slip op. at

The Court of Appeals does not, however, identify the evidence

on which it bases this conclusion.
evidence

in this case

admits

Plaintiff asserts that the

of no conclusion

but

that the

defendants were negligent as a matter of law.
The undisputed evidence in this case established that post
surgery x-rays showed the existence of a sponge marker.

The

marker appears in a neat, straight line, not as one would expect
had the sponge been lost in a body cavity.

The evidence further

showed that such an x-ray could not establish that a sponge was in
the body, but that an additional x-ray from a lateral view would
be required to establish whether the sponge was actually inside
the body and the exact location of the sponge.

Rather than have

such an x-ray taken, however, which would have been a simple
procedure, the doctors instead performed a second operation on a
critically ill patient in an attempt to locate the sponge.
14

These facts acTmit of no explanation other than that the
doctors were negligent.

The plaintiff clearly had no part in the

circumstances leading to the second operation, because he was
under anesthesia the entire time.

This Court has held that the

leaving of a foreign object in a body cavity is something which
jurors can determine to be negligent without expert testimony.
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352

(Utah 1980).

With even

greater certainty one must conclude that the performance of an
operation to remove a sponge which apparently did not exist is
negligence as a matter of law.
Plaintiff has not been able to discover any cases dealing
with an operation to remove a foreign object which did not exist.
Plaintiff acknowledges that in Nixdorf, supra, the court held that
the leaving of a foreign object in a body cavity did not constitute negligence as a matter of law.

In that case, however,

there was evidence that metal objects are frequently placed or
left in body cavities without adverse side affects.
357 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

612 P.2d at

In the instant case, however, the

issue is not whether it was negligent to leave something in the
body cavity, because nothing was left in the plaintiff.

The issue

is rather whether it was negligent as a matter of law to perform
surgery to remove a foreign object which did not exist, where the
taking of a second x-ray would have readily revealed that the
15

foreign object was not located in the body.

Plaintiff respect-

fully submits that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold
that the doctors were negligent as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The known and unknown factors of the instant case call forth
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
which proximately

caused

The instrumentality or agency

injury to the plaintiff was

in the

possession of and under the exclusive control of the defendant
doctors at the time the cause of the injury was set in motion, and
it appeared that the injury resulted from some act or omission
incident to the defendants1 responsibility to use due care.

Mr.

Roylance was returned to surgery to search for a sponge, after a
correct sponge count.

The doctors failed to take a subsequent x-

ray to determine the locality of the sponge.

The appellant could

not fully reveal all of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the accident.

The location and origin of the sponge was never

accounted for by either party.

The facts in the instant case,

therefore, present exactly the type of circumstances which give
rise to the plaintifffs right to utilize the theory of res ipsa
loquitur.

The trial courtfs failure to so instruct the jury

constituted reversible error.
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Erling A. Roylance,
Plaintiff and Appellant/
OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Lynn B. Rowe, Dean L. Bristow,
J. R. Monnahan, and Mountain
View Hospital,

Case No. 860023-CA

Defendants and Respondents.
Before Judges Billings, Garff and Jackson

BILLINGS, Judge:

FILED
MAY 1 2 1987
Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Plaintiff Roylance brought an action against Doctors Rowe
and Bristow, and Mountain View Hospital for medical malpractice
arising from surgery performed in June, 1981. At the
conclusion of Roylance's case-in-chief/ defendant Mountain View
Hospital was dismissed. Subsequently, the jury found the
remaining two doctor defendants not negligent and judgment was
entered in favor of defendants, no cause of action. Roylance
seeks reversal claiming the trial court erred (a) in not
granting a directed verdict in favor of plaintiff and in
failing to allow a new trial based upon the weight of the
evidence; (b) in denying plaintiffs requested jury instruction
on res ipsa loquitur; and (c) in failing to dismiss defendant
hospital at the commencement of trial. We affirm.
Roylance entered Mountain View Hospital for removal of an
acute gangrenous perforated gallbladder. The emergency surgery
was performed by Drs. Rowe and Bristow. Following the surgery,
the scrub nurse counted the sponges; the figures totaled and
matched the initial count. After the doctors closed Roylance's
incision, an x-ray was taken which revealed the presence of a
4" x 4H piece of gauze. The doctors checked Roylance1s
external bandages and bed clothes and finding nothing,
determined a sponge had been left internally. The doctors
thereafter performed another operation to locate the sponge or
gauze; no sponge or gauze was located. This action was brought

against Drs. Rowe and Bristow and Mountain View Hospital on
grounds that Roylance was subjected to unnecessary surgery.
Following a pre-trial settlement and release of Mountain
View Hospital, Roylance unsuccessfully moved to dismiss
Mountain View Hospital, The court, however, dismissed the
hospital at the conclusion of Roylance's case-in-chief and
directed a verdict in the hospital's favor. At the conclusion
of the trial against the remaining two doctors, the court
denied Roylance's requested jury instruction on res ipsa
loquitur but submitted the issue of the defendants' negligence
to the jury. The jury found the doctors were not negligent.
The court then denied Roylance's motion for a new trial.
I.
Roylance first contends there was insufficient evidence to
justify the jury's verdict of no cause of action on negligence
and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant
Roylance's motion for a new trial. The law on this point is
well established. Where the trial court has denied a motion
for a new trial based upon insufficiency of evidence to justify
the verdict, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there
was an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. The trial
court's denial of the motion will be reversed only if the
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust. Nelson v. Truiillo. 657 P.2d 730, 732
(Utah 1982); £££ Hall v. Anderson. 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977).
The trial record contains ample evidence to support the
jury's finding that the doctors were not negligent. We do not
find the evidence supporting the jury's finding so lacking or
unconvincing as to make the verdict unreasonable or unjust.
II.
Roylance next contends the trial court erred in failing to
give the jury an instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa
loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in the proof of
negligence. Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah
1980). The purpose of res ipsa loquitur is
to permit one who suffers injury from
something under the control of another,
which ordinarily would not cause injury
except for the other's negligence, to
present his grievance to a court or jury
on the basis that an inference of
negligence may reasonably be drawn from
such facts; and cast the burden upon the
other to make proof of what happened.
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J&. at 833 (emphasis added) (citing Lund v. Phillips Petroleum
££., 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (I960); £££ also Joseph v. wt
H. Groves Latter Dav Saint Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d
935 (1960); White v Pinnev, 99 Utah 484, 108 P.2d 249 (1940).
A res ipsa loquitur instruction is appropriate where a
plaintiff is unable to pinpoint which act or omission on the
part of a defendant breached a legally imposed standard of
care.1
Before being entitled to such a jury instruction, however,
a plaintiff must show:
(1) [T]hat the accident was of a kind
which, in the ordinary course of events,
would not have happened had due care been
observed; (2) that the plaintiff's own
use or operation of the agency or
instrumentality was not primarily
responsible for the injury; and (3) that
the agency or instrumentality causing the
injury was under the exclusive management
or control of the defendant.
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp.. 681 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah
1984) (citing Anderton, 607 P.2d at 833).
Application of res ipsa loquitur is, however, premised on
the plaintiffs inability to produce evidence identifying the
precise negligent act or omission on the part of a defendant
which caused the harm. There is no room for the operation of
res ipsa loquitur where the evidence in the case reveals all of
the facts and circumstances of the occurrence and clearly
establishes the precise allegedly negligent act which is the
cause of plaintiffs injury. See Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel
Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1984). See also
Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 189, 193 (Alaska 1965); Ballhorst
v. Hahner-Forman-Cale. Inc.. 207 Kan. 89, 99, 484 P.2d 38, 46
(1971); Hugo v. Manning, 201 Kan. 391, 395-98, 441 P.2d 145,
149-51 (1968); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co.. 64 Wash. 431, 392 P.2d
317, 322 (1964).
This does not mean that introduction of evidence of
specific acts of negligence deprives a plaintiff of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This jurisdiction has long held
1. Although in the majority of medical malpractice cases, the
plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish the
standard of care, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized certain
situations where expert testimony is unnecessary. Nixdorf v.
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). We do not reach the
issue in this case.
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that a case presented to the jury on specific theories of
negligence does not preclude an instruction on a theory of res
ipsa loquitur- Anaerman Co. v, Edcremon. 76 Utah 394, 400, 290
P. 169, 172 (1930). Rather, the rule may be summarized as
follows: Where the three conditions for application of res
ipsa loquitur have been established, a mere prima facia showing
of specific negligence does not prevent its use. Under such
circumstances the case should be submitted on both the theory
of specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur. Thus, if proof
by a plaintiff of specific acts of negligence on the
defendant's part does not furnish a complete explanation of the
accident, as where there are alternative theories of
negligence, there is still room for an inference of negligence
arising from the happening of the accident. Where, however,
proof of specific negligence goes so far as to reveal all the
facts and circumstances and fully explain the alleged negligent
cause of injury by positive evidence, res ipsa loquitur has no
function. Kusy, 681 P.2d at 1236.
In the case before us, Roylance argues that the second,
unnecessary surgery was an accident which would not have
happened had due care been observed, that Roylance was not
responsible for the injury, and that the instrumentality
causing the injury was under the exclusive control of the
defendant doctors. Roylance concludes that, inasmuch as the
three conditions of res ipsa loquitur have been satisfied, the
court should have instructed on the doctrine. As the foregoing
discussion makes clear, however, our analysis must not end.
The issue remains whether at trial Roylance offered evidence of
specific negligence so as to fully explain the alleged
negligent cause of injury. If the evidence received at trial
fully revealed all of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the accident, res ipsa loquitur has no application.
In this case, there is no dispute that the injury, the
unnecessary second surgery, was caused by the defendant
doctors. The doctors do not deny that a second surgery was
performed to remove what appeared to be a sponge left inside
the defendant; they do not deny that this surgery was performed
following a correct sponge count but after a suspicious x-ray;
they do not deny that the subsequent operation failed to locate
any sponge or gauze. Inasmuch as the evidence introduced by
Roylance clearly and completely delineated how Roylance1s
injuries occurred, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no
application, as there is nothing left to infer. The jury was
only required to determine if this conduct breached the
requisite standard of care. The court therefore did not err in
refusing to give Roylance1s proposed instruction on res ipsa
loquitur. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to
consider the other points raised by respondents.
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III.
Finally, Roylance contends the trial court erred in failing
to dismiss defendant hospital at the commencement of trial.
Prior to the commencement of trial, Roylance entered into a
settlement agreement with defendant Mountain View Hospital
relieving the hospital from liability to make contribution to
the doctors pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1977).2
Roylance moved to dismiss defendant Mountain View Hospital;
defendant doctors argued that under § 78-27-43 Mountain View
Hospital could not be dismissed from the action until the issue
of proportionate fault had been litigated. The court denied
Roylance1s motion and compelled Mountain View Hospital to
remain a defendant until the completion of Roylance*s case.
The pertinent section of the Utah Code provides:
(1) A release by the injured person of one
joint tort-feasor does not relieve him
from liability to make contribution to
another joint tort-feasor unless that
release:
(a) Is given before the right of the
other tort-feasor to secure a money
judgment for contribution has
accrued; and
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the
extent of the prorata share of the
released tort-feasor, of the injured
person's damages recoverable against
all the other tort-feasors.
(2) This section shall apply only if the
issue of proportionate fault is litigated
between joint tort-feasors in the same
action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1977).
Roylance could relieve defendant Mountain View Hospital
from liability for contribution only under the express
provisions of § 78-27-43. Madsen v. Salt Lake Citv School Bd.,
645 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1982); See Thode, Comparative
Negligence, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of
2. This case was decided prior to the 1986 modification of
provisions relating to comparative negligence which, among •
other things, abolished joint and several liability and rights
of contribution among joint tort-feasors. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-27-38 to -43 (1986).
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a Release—A Triple Plav bv the Utah Legislature. 1973 Utah L.
Rev. 406, 431-33. As noted, this section specifically states
that it shall apply only if proportionate fault is litigated
between joint tort-feasors in the same action, as only then can
the plaintiff's judgment be proportionately reduced by the
released tort-feasor's established fault.
Roylance cannot claim the benefits of § 78-27-43 to release
Mountain View Hospital from liability to make contribution and
at the same time deny defendant doctors the right to litigate
the hospital's proportionate fault. The trial court did not
err in denying Roylance's motion to dismiss Mountain View
Hospital at the commencement of trial.
Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
respondent.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

R. W. Garff, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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Costs to

